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Introduction
Abdullahi An-Na’im’s Philosophy on Islam and Human Rights
	 “I	am	proposing	 the	principles	of	constitutionalism,	human	rights	and	citizenship,	
which can work only when they enjoy sufficient cultural and religious legitimacy to 
inspire	and	motivate	people	 to	participate	 in	organized	and	sustained	political	and	
legal	action.	An	Islamic	discourse	is	essential	for	legitimizing	the	necessary	strategies	
for	regulating	the	public	role	of	Islam.	At	the	same	time,	that	discourse	cannot	emerge	
or	 be	 effective	 without	 the	 security	 and	 stability	 provided	 by	 the	 secular	 state.”	
	 	 	 	 	 	 -	Abdullahi	An-Na’im.
The	relationship	between	Islam	and	human	rights	forms	an	important	aspect	
of	 contemporary	 international	human	 rights	discourse.	Current	 international	
events	and	the	increasing	public	role	of	Islam	in	modern	Muslim	states	have	
made	 the	 subject	more	 relevant	 than	ever.	Many	 international	human	 rights	
courses	around	the	world	now	cover	issues	relating	to	Islam	and	human	rights.	
Some universities and academic centres have specific postgraduate courses or 
modules on the subject. The importance of the subject as a specific theme in 
general	human	rights	discourse	is	portrayed	by	the	volume	of	literature	currently	
available	on	its	different	aspects.	Professor	Abdullahi	Ahmed	An-Na’im	is	one	
of	the	leading	scholars	and	contributors	on	the	subject.	In	fact,	he	remains	one	
of	the	most	cited	authorities	in	the	subject	area.	His	contributions	on	the	subject	
span	more	than	three	decades	during	which	he	has	engaged	with	almost	every	
topical	issue	on	the	subject.	He	has	been	described	as	one	of	the	non-Western	
jurists	 from	 “the	 South”	 “who	 have	 made	 substantial	 contributions	 to	 the	
theory	and	practice	of	human	rights”	generally.	It	is	therefore	a	great	honour	
to	be	commissioned	to	compile	and	write	an	introduction	to	a	selection	of	his	
	 This	 introductory	 chapter	 and	 revision	 of	 manuscript	 for	 this	 volume	 was	
completed	 during	my	 professorial	 visit	 to	 the	 Faculty	 of	 Syariah	 and	 Law,	 Islamic	
Sciences	University	of	Malaysia,	Malaysia	in	December	008.	I	thank	the	University	
for	the	opportunity	and	for	the	facilities	provided,	which	enabled	me	to	complete	this	
work	during	the	period.	I	particularly	express	my	gratitude	to	the	Dean	of	the	Faculty,	
Professor	Dr.	Abdul	Samat	Musa,	 and	 to	Mohammad	Nizam	bn	Awang	and	Ahmad	
Anis	bn	Muhammad	Fauzi	for	their	kind	hospitality	during	the	period.
	 A.A.	An-Na’im,	 Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari’a	
(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	008)	p.	44.
	 W.	Twining,	“Human	Rights:	Southern	Voices;	Frances	Deng,	Abdullahi	An-Na’im,	
Yash	Ghai	and	Upendra	Baxi”	 (007)		Law, Social Justice & Global Development 
Journal (LGD)	http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/007_/twining	at	p.	.	
(Last	accessed	6	December	008)	
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scholarly	essays	on	the	subject.	This	single	volume	brings	together,	coherently,	
his	thoughts	as	developed	on	the	subject	over	the	years.	It	will	provide	easy	
access	 and	 convenience	 to	 students,	 academics,	 researchers,	 practitioners,	
policy-makers	and	all	those	interested	in	this	important	subject	area.
The	 quotation	 at	 the	 top	 of	 this	 introductory	 chapter	 is	 taken	 from	An-
Na’im’s	latest	book,	Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating The Future of 
Shari’a, which he describes as “the culmination of my life’s work, the final 
statement	I	wish	to	make	on	issues	I	have	been	struggling	with	since	I	was	a	
student	at	the	University	of	Khartoum,	Sudan,	in	the	late	960s”.4	While	the	
quotation	summarises,	succinctly,	his	ultimate	standpoint	on	Islam	and	human	
rights	in	modern	Muslim	states,	the	evolution	of	that	standpoint	can	only	be	
better	appreciated	and	understood	through	the	reading	of	his	scholarly	writings	
over	the	years.	Thus,	for	a	comprehensive	insight	into	his	general	philosophy	
on	 the	 subject,	 this	 volume	 presents	 sixteen	 of	 his	 scholarly	 journal	 essays	
published	between	986	and	006	illustrating	the	progression	and	consistency	
of	 his	 arguments	 over	 a	 period	 of	 twenty	 years.	 The	 essays	 are	 presented	
herein,	not	chronologically,	but	coherently,	in	a	way	that	takes	the	reader	on	a	
scholarly	journey	through	An-Nai’m’s	general	philosophy	on	Islam	and	human	
rights	 in	a	consistent	way.	 In	essence,	 this	volume	cuts	across	 twenty	years	
of	An-Nai’m’s	expressed	 thoughts	on	a	complex	subject	before	his	ultimate	
arrival	at	the	standpoint	portrayed	in	his	quotation	cited	at	the	beginning	of	this	
introductory	chapter.
It	 is	 important	 to	 state	 that	 this	 prologue	 is	 not	 intended	 to	 be	 a	 critical	
analysis	or	a	critique	of	An-Na’im’s	work	contained	herein.	Rather,	it	presents	
the	work	“as	it	is”,	providing	a	brief	summary	of	each	of	the	essays	contained	
in	the	volume	and	identifying	in	the	process,	what	I	consider	to	be	the	main	
elements	of	his	general	philosophy	on	the	subject.	Based	on	their	content,	the	
essays	are	grouped	into	four	parts	as	follows.
I. Islam between Universalism and Secularism
Universalism	is	considered	to	be	at	the	heart	of	human	rights	today,	while	the	
modern	nation-state	is	considered	more	often	in	secular	 terms.	This	 literally	
puts	Islam	between	universality	of	human	rights	and	secularity	of	the	modern	
nation-state	 particularly in modern Muslim states. Read together, the five 
essays in this part reflect An-Na’im’s perception of the position of Islam in 
relation	 to	 the	considered	universality	of	human	rights	and	secularity	of	 the	
modern	nation-state.	
4	 A.A.	An-Na’im,	supra,	note		above,	at	vii.
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The	 usual	 starting	 point	 of	 human	 rights	 discourse	 is	 the	 question	 of	 its	
universality. The first United Nations (UN) human rights instrument adopted 
in	 948	 is	 called	 Universal	 Declaration	 of	 Human	 Rights	 (UDHR),	 which	
clearly	indicates	that	the	international	human	rights	agenda	was	meant	to	be	a	
universal	one	from	the	beginning.	Yet,	there	have	been	two	persistent	questions	
in	that	regard	since	the	concept	of	universal	human	rights	was	mooted	under	
the UN system. The first question is, what do we mean by universality of 
human	rights?,	and	the	second	is,	how	can	that	universality	be	achieved?	It	is	
on	record	that	one	of	the	earliest	questions	posed	to	the	UN	Commission	on	
Human	Rights,	then	drafting	the	UDHR,	was	the	statement	submitted	to	the	
Commission	by	the	American	Anthropological	Association	(AAA)	on	4	June	
947	about	the	proposed	universality	of	human	rights	and	how	that	would	be	
achieved.	The	AAA	had	observed	then	that:
	 Because	of	the	great	numbers	of	societies	that	are	in	intimate	contact	in	the	modern	
world,	and	because	of	the	diversity	of	their	ways	of	life,	the	primary	task	confronting	
those	who	would	draw	up	a	Declaration	on	the	Rights	of	Man	is	thus,	in	essence,	to	
resolve	the	following	problem:	How	can	the	proposed	Declaration	be	applicable	to	all	
human	beings,	and	not	be	a	statement	of	rights	conceived	only	in	terms	of	the	values	
prevalent	 in	 the	countries	of	Western	Europe	and	America?	…Today	 the	problem	
is	complicated	by	the	fact	that	the	Declaration	must	be	of	world-wide	applicability.	
It	must	embrace	and	 recognize	 the	validity	of	many	different	ways	of	 life.	 It	will	
not	be	convincing	to	the	Indonesian,	the	African,	the	Indian,	the	Chinese,	if	it	 lies	
on	the	same	plane	as	like	documents	of	an	earlier	period.	The	rights	of	Man	in	the	
Twentieth	Century	cannot	be	circumscribed	by	the	standards	of	any	single	culture,	
or	be	dictated	by	the	aspirations	of	any	single	people.	Such	a	document	will	lead	to	
frustration,	not	realization	of	the	personalities	of	vast	numbers	of	human	beings.6
Although	the	UDHR	has,	today,	established	itself	as	an	instrument	of	great	
influence globally, those questions have not been fully subdued in international 
human	rights	discourse	and,	in	relation	to	the	socio-cultural	and	politico-legal	
influence of Islam in Muslim societies, they remain part of the fundamental 
questions	in	the	Islam	and	human	rights	discourse.	
	 That	was	in	947	when	the	statement	was	issued,	but	this	question	has	not	fully	
disappeared	from	international	human	rights	discourse	even	today.
6	 See American	Anthropological	Association,	‘Statement	on	Human	Rights’	(947)	
49	American Anthropologist, pp. 9–4,	 at	 pp.	 9	 and	4–.	Cf.	 the	999	AAA	
Declaration	on	Anthropology	and	Human	Rights	available	at:	http://www.aaanet.org/
stmts/humanrts.htm	[9//08]	and	K.	Engle,	“From	Scepticism	to	Embrace:	Human	
Rights	 and	 the	American	Anthropological	Association	 from	 947–999”	 (00)	 	
Human Rights Quarterly,	No.,	pp.	6–9,	for	an	analysis	of	the	two	Statements.
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This volume thus opens with an essay first published in 1994 by An-Na’im 
entitled	“What	do	we	mean	by	universal?”	in	which	he	articulates	his	views	
on	the	universality	of	human	rights	in	relation	to	Islam.	The	essay	was	written	
in	the	context	of	the	990	Salman	Rushdie	affair	and	the	consequent	fatwa	of	
Iran’s	Ayatollah	Khomeini	against	Salman	Rushdie.	An-Na’im	is	certainly	a	
universalist	and	a	staunch	believer	in	the	universal	nature	of	human	rights	as	
is reflected in the first paragraph of this essay where he states that “[h]uman 
rights ought, by definition, to be universal in concept, scope and content as 
well	as	in	application:	a	globally	accepted	set	of	rights	or	claims	to	which	all	
human	beings	are	entitled	by	virtue	of	their	humanity	and	without	distinction	
on	grounds	such	as	race,	gender	or	religion”	(p.	0).	He	also	notes,	however,	
that	“[y]et	there	can	be	no	prospect	of	the	universal	application	of	such	rights	
unless	 there	 is,	 at	 least,	 substantial	 agreement	 on	 their	 concept,	 scope	 and	
content”	(p.	).	Thus,	his	philosophy	on	the	universality	of	human	rights,	as	
he	manifests	in	this	essay	and	consistently	restates	at	appropriate	points	in	all	
his	other	writings,	is	what	may	be	described	as	a	philosophy	of	cross-cultural	
universality. I identify this as the first element of his general philosophy on 
Islam and human rights. In relation to Islam, he reflects this philosophy of 
cross-cultural	 universality	 in	 the	 last	 paragraph	 of	 the	 essay	 wherein	 he	
concludes	 that	 “There	 are	 potentially	 powerful	 and	 vigorous	 constituencies	
for	universal	human	rights	worldwide	–	including	the	Islamic	world.	But	those	
constituencies	can	never	be	mobilised	in	a	global	project	on	purely	Western	
liberal	notions	of	individual	civil	and	political	rights.	Along	with	other	rights	
and	new	formulations	of	familiar	rights,	all	human	rights	will	only	command	
genuine	 universal	 respect	 and	 validity	 through	 discourse	 and	 dialogue”	 (p.	
128). Between the first paragraph earlier quoted and this last paragraph of 
the	essay,	An-Na’im	clearly	articulates	his	views	on	 the	different	paradoxes	
raised	by	the	question	of	universality	in	theory	and	practice.	He	emphasises	
throughout	 the	 essay	 that	 the	 dialogue	 for	 cross-cultural	 universality	 must	
be	“undertaken	in	good	faith,	with	mutual	respect	for,	and	sensitivity	to,	the	
integrity	and	fundamental	concerns	of	respective	cultures,	with	an	open	mind	
and	with	the	recognition	that	existing	formulations	may	be	changed	–	or	even	
abolished	–	in	the	process”	(p.	).	
But	what	kind	of	contribution	can	Islam	bring	to	this	dialogue	towards	the	
realisation of a cross-cultural universality of human rights? An-Na’im identifies 
that	in	“[r]eading	the	Qur’an	and	Sunna, one will find authority for liberalism 
as	well	 as	 conservatism,	 and	Muslim	 history	 gives	 clear	 examples	 of	 both	
tendencies”.	This	matter,	 he	 argues	 “is	 determined	 by	 the	 choices	Muslims	
make,	 and	 the	 struggle	 they	 wage	 in	 favour	 of	 their	 choices,	 in	 their	 own	
historical	context”	(p.	).	Thus,	for	Islam	to	be	able	to	make	a	meaningful	
contribution	 to	 the	 dialogue	 for	 cross-cultural	 universality	 of	 human	 rights,	
xviiAbdullahi An-Na’im
Muslims	 must,	 in	 the	 view	 of	An-Na’im,	 choose	 liberal	 interpretations	 of	
Islamic	 sources	 to	 make	 Islamic	 law	 amenable	 to	 modern	 international	
relations	and	human	rights.	He	develops	this	point	further	in	the	next	essay,	
which	serves	as	the	basis	for	the	second	element	of	his	general	philosophy	on	
Islam	and	human	rights.
The	second	essay,	“Islamic	Law,	International	Relations,	and	Human	Rights:	
Challenge and Response”, was first published in 1987. In it An-Na’im proposes 
“solutions	to	the	drawbacks	of	historical	Shari’a	from	a	religious	rather	than	
secular	 perspective,	 because	Muslims	 do	 not	 separate	 the	 religion	 of	 Islam	
from	the	law	of	Islam”	(p.	8).	He	argues	here	that	a	reformation	of	Islamic	
law	through	a	modern	interpretation	of	the	Shari’a	would	work	better	for	the	
advancement	of	human	rights	 in	Muslim	states	 than	a	secular	approach.	He	
observes,	inter alia,	in	that	regard	that	“because	Shari’a signifies the positive 
law	of	historical	 Islam,	 its	general	principles	continue	 to	bind	and	motivate	
Muslims”	 (p.	 9)	 and	 that	 the	 appeal	 of	 the	Shari’a	 amongst	 the	majority	
of	Muslims	makes	 it	 imperative	 for	 it	 to	 be	 “authoritatively	 reformed	 from	
within	the	Islamic	traditions	and	in	ways	acceptable	to	Muslims	themselves,	
[o]therwise,	 such	 reform	 would	 lack	 legitimacy	 and	 practical	 viability”	
(p.	9).	He	also	notes,	however,	that	“although	Muslims	will	not	accept	secular	
reforms	to	their	religious	law	and	practice,	they	have	made	some	concessions	
to	 the	 demands	 of	 constitutionalism	 and	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 national	 and	
international	relations”	(p.	9).	He	summarizes	his	arguments	in	this	essay	to	
the	effect	that	“for	Islamic	states,	smooth	and	successful	transition	to	complete	
secularism	is	neither	likely	nor	desirable	because	Muslims	are	obligated	to	live	
in accordance with Islamic law” (p. 320). However, in his view, “[f]ulfilling 
that	 obligation	 by	 re-introducing	 historical	Shari’a	 would	 be	 disastrous	 for	
international	relations	and	human	rights”	(p.	0).	He	therefore	proposes	that	
“the Muslims’ religious duty may be satisfied by applying a modern version of 
Islamic	law	that	is	consistent	with	peaceful	international	relations	and	respect	
for	human	rights”	and	that	“[t]his	modern	version	will	[still]	be	Islamic	Shari’a	
because	 it	 will	 be	 derived	 from	 the	 fundamental	 sources	 of	 Islam,	without	
being	identical	in	every	respect	to	historical	Shari’a”	(p.	0).	
An-Na’im	then	goes	on,	in	this	essay,	to	analyse	the	historical	Shari’ah	and	
the	Medina	model	of	the	Islamic	state,	arguing	at	the	end	of	that	analysis	that	
“[m]odern jurists must not confine Islam to [historical] Shari’a”,	noting	that	
if they do so it would unjustifiably condemn Islam “to Shari’a’s	contextual	
limitations	and	deem	it	incapable	of	responding	to	changes	in	the	physical	and	
social	environment	that	are,	according	to	Muslim	belief,	willed	and	manifested	
by	God	Himself”	(p.	).	He	also	critically	examines	the	theory	of	international	
relations	under	the	Shari’a,	discussing	the	traditional	concept	of	jihad	and	its	
implications	to	modern	theory	of	international	relations	and	human	rights.	He	
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emphasises	in	the	end	that	while	“Shari’a’s	[historical]	view	of	civil	liberties	
compared	favourably	with	civil	rights	under	Roman	and	Persian	law	prevailing	
at	the	time…criticism	and	strong	objection	must	be	raised	to	any	attempt	to	
reintroduce	 historical	 public	 Shari’a	 today	 because	 it	 is	 inconsistent	 with	
prevailing	human	rights	standards”	(p.	).	But	he	also	argues	conversely	that	
“[w]hile	this	Article	criticizes	historical	public	Shari’a	as	being	inconsistent	
with prevailing human rights standards, it does not unqualifiedly endorse those 
standards	 that	originated	with	 the	western	 liberal	 tradition”	(p.	).	Rather	
he	proposes	solutions	from	within	Islam,	stating	that	a	“legitimate	and	lasting	
constitutional	and	legal	order	that	can	address	modern	international	relations	
and	 domestic	 human	 rights	must	 develop	 from	within	 Islam”	 (p.	 ),	 for	
which	he	argues	that	the	best	solution	must	be	based	on	the	methodology	of	his	
late	mentor	Ustadh	Mahmoud	Mohamed	Taha,	who	was	executed	in	Sudan	in	
98	for	the	alleged	offence	of	apostasy	under	Sudanese	law	then.7	An-Na’im	
consistently	proposes	Ustadh	Mahmoud	Taha’s	methodology	as	the	best	means	
of	 transforming	 Islamic	 law	 to	meet	 the	 standards	 of	modern	 human	 rights	
and	international	relations	in	all	the	essays	contained	herein	as	well	as	in	his	
other	major	works	on	the	subject.	This	may	be	described	as	the	philosophy	of	
internal	reformation	of	Islamic	law	based	on	the	methodology	of	his	mentor	
Ustadh	Mahmoud	Mohamed	Taha,	which	I	identify	as	the	second	element	of	
his	general	philosophy	on	Islam	and	human	rights.
An-Na’im’s	proposition	for	the	internal	reformation	of	Islamic	law	is	taken	
further in the third essay, “A Kinder, Gentler Islam?” first published in 1991. In 
this	essay,	he	argues	essentially	for	a	kinder,	gentler	interpretation	of	the	Islamic	
sources.	The	essay	is	framed	in	the	context	of	right	to	self-determination	and	
principle	 of	 reciprocity.	Here,	An-Na’im	 focuses	 on	 “the	 need	 to	 transform	
the	historical	 traditions	of	Muslim	peoples	 in	ways	 that	would	enable	 them	
to	exercise	 their	 legitimate	rights	 to	self-determination	without	violating	the	
rights of others” (p. 4). He identifies with the fact that Muslim peoples have 
the right to choose an Islamic definition of their self but argues that this should 
not	be	by	reference	to	what	he	calls	“historical	Shari’a”;	a	point	he	made	in	
the	previous	essay	and	consistently	reiterates	in	other	essays	contained	in	this	
volume and throughout his writings. He proposes here that self definition by 
Muslims must be properly clarified and updated, for which he asserts again 
that	 “the	 Islamic	 tradition	must	undergo	 its	own	 reformation	and	develop	a	
modern	conception	of	Shari’a	that	can	be	implemented	today”	(p.	8).	He	again	
acknowledges	that	the	norms	of	“historical	Shari’a”	were	far	more	enlightened	
and	 humane	 than	 corresponding	 principles	 and	 conceptions	 of	 its	 time,	 but	
argues	that	most	of	those	norms	cannot	stand	up	to	the	minimum	standards	of	
7	 See	Chapter		“The	Islamic	Law	of	Apostasy	and	its	Modern	Applicability:	A	Case	
from	The	Sudan”	in	this	volume.
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modern	human	rights,	which	are	universal	and	must	be	enjoyed	by	everyone	
including	Muslims.	He	therefore	makes	it	clear	that	his	“criticisms	are	not	…	
addressed	 to	Shari’a	 in	 its	 own	 proper	 historical	 context	 but	 rather	 against	
those	who	wish	to	resurrect	dated	concepts	and	principles	and	implement	them	
under	radically	transformed	domestic	and	international	conditions”	(p.	).	
In	An-Na’im’s	 view	 it	 is	 possible,	 indeed	 imperative,	 “to	 develop	 a	 new	
version	of	Shari’a	based	on	a	modern	interpretation	of	the	sources	of	Islam”	
(p.	)	 in	ways	 that	would	promote	a	kinder,	gentler	 Islam.	He	 states:	 “Far	
from	 advocating	 the	 abandonment	 of	 the	 Islamic	 tradition,	 I	 am	 calling	 on	
Muslims	 to	 achieve	 their	 own	 ‘reformation’	 in	 order	 to	 transform	 their	
tradition	into	a	viable	and	just	ideology	for	their	modern	exercise	of	their	right	
to	self-determination”	(p.	).	He	then	goes	on	to	elaborate	on	his	proposed	
methodology	of	transforming	this	tradition,	which	is	again	the	methodology	of	
his	late	mentor	Ustadh	Mahmoud	Mohamed	Taha.	He	argues	“In	the	Muslim	
belief	that	I	share,	Islam	is	perfect	and	eternal	from	God’s	point	of	view,	but	
in	the	affairs	of	the	world,	it	is	open	to	competing	interpretations	and	practical	
policies reflecting the moral and intellectual capabilities of its adherents and 
their	need	to	adapt	to	changing	material	and	political	conditions”	(p.	).	He	
continues,	“In	the	formula	I	propose,	the	constant	part	of	the	Islamic	tradition	
is	the	texts	of	its	divine	sources	while	the	interpretation	and	implementation	
of	those	sources	must	now	be	transformed”	(p.	).	To	illustrate	his	arguments	
against	the	application	of	“historical	Shari’a”	he	cites	Sudan	as	an	example	of	
where	“efforts	on	behalf	of	a	misconceived	Islamic	identity	seeking	to	implement	
historical	Shari’a	…	led	to	a	total	deadlock	politically	and	contributed	to	the	
militarization	of	the	entire	country”	(p.	).	He	asserts	that	the	ideal	would	be	
to	ensure	the	right	of	Muslims	“to	self-determination	in	terms	of	an	Islamic	
identity	without	 violating	 the	 right	 of	 self-determination	 of	 others”	 (p.	 6).	
Failing	 that,	he	 states	 in	conclusion	 that	he	“as	an	Arabized	Muslim	whose	
loyalty	is	to	the	cause	of	justice	and	peace	for	all	Sudanese,	would	rather	live	
in	a	secularised	Sudan	than	in	one	ruled	by	totalitarian	Islamic	Shari’a”	(p.	6),	
thereby introducing a refined argument for secularism which appears to be a 
departure	from	his	previous	position	that	secularism	may	lack	legitimacy	and	
practical	viability	for	his	proposed	reforms	in	Muslim	societies.8 This refined 
position	of	secularism	is	pursued	further	by	him	in	the	next	essay.
The fourth essay, “Re-affirming Secularism for Islamic Societies” was first 
published	in	00.	His	argument	in	this	essay	is	against	the	background	of	the	
debate	“about	whether	a	new	system	of	government	that	is	both	Islamic	and	
democratic	can	be	built	as	some	kind	of	model	for	the	[Middle	East]	region”	
(p.	 6)	 after	 the	 overthrow	 of	 Saddam	Hussein’s	 Ba’athist	 regime	 in	 Iraq.	
He first identifies that “the central issue that must be debated among Iraqis 
8	 See	Chapter		in	this	volume.
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–	as	among	modernizing	Muslims	everywhere	–	 is	 the	relationship	between	
Islam	and	secularism	in	any	new	political	system”	(p.	6).	He	then	proceeds	to	
provide his reflections on that point from an Islamic perspective. 
In addressing the issue of Islam versus secularism, An-Na’im first argues 
that	“[t]he	commonly	presumed	incompatibility	between	Islam	and	secularism	
needs to be re-evaluated” (p. 36). He observes that there is both a definitional 
and	 terminological	 as	 well	 as	 substantive	 confusion	 about	 the	 presumed	
incompatibility	between	Islam	and	secularism,	which	needs	to	be	deconstructed.	
In	trying	to	deconstruct	the	traditional	understanding	of	secularism	he	argues	
that	the	traditional	equation	of	secularism	with	complete	disregard	for	religion,	
or	a	diminishing	role	for	religion	in	public	life	is	problematic.	He	criticises	“the	
tendency	to	limit	secularism	to	the	experiences	of	west	European	and	North	
American	 countries	 with	 Christianity	 since	 the	 8th	 century”,	 pointing	 out	
that	in	its	west	European	and	North	American	sense	the	term	secularism	“has	
come	to	Africa	and	Asia	in	the	suspect	company	of	colonialism”.	In	his	view	
“secularism	should	be	understood	in	terms	of	the	type	of	relationship	between	
religion and the state, rather than a specific way in which that relationship has 
evolved	in	one	society	or	another”.	After	that	terminological	deconstruction	of	
the concept of secularism, he then proceeds to argue for the re-affirmation of 
secularism	in	Muslim	states	and	proposes	that	“the	most	compelling	argument	
for	an	Islamic	rationale	for	secularism	is	its	necessity	for	pluralistic	nation	states	
that	are	able	to	safeguard	the	freedom	of	religion	and	belief	of	believers	and	
non-believers	alike”	(p.	7),	meaning	that	“the	freedom	of	religion	and	belief	
of	Muslims	as	well	as	non-Muslims	is	more	likely	to	be	violated	by	a	state	that	
seeks	to	promote	a	particular	religious	doctrine	than	one	that	is	neutral	on	the	
matter”.	He	illustrates	his	points	by	citing	examples	of	Muslim	intellectuals	
and	political	dissidents	who	have	sought	refuge	in	Western	countries	“because	
they	enjoy	more	freedom	of	belief	and	political	action	in	“secular”	states	that	
are	more	or	less	neutral	on	issues	of	religion”	(p.	8).	He	further	argues	that	
the	notion	of	an	Islamic	State	is	a	contradiction	in	terms	and	that	the	diversity	
of	opinion	among	Islamic	schools	of	thought	and	scholars	makes	it	impossible	
for	 the	state	 to	enact	 the	Shari’a	 into	positive	 law	as	 that	would	 lead	 to	 the	
selection	 of	 some	 opinions	 over	 others	 by	 the	 state	 and	 consequently	 deny	
Muslims	 the	 freedom	to	 follow	other	equally	 legitimate	 Islamic	opinions	of	
their	 choice.	 In	 his	 view,	Muslims	 actually	 “need	 the	 protection	 of	 human	
rights,	and	political	and	social	space	secured	by	secularism	to	live	up	to	the	
ideals	of	their	own	religion”	and	asserts	that	such	“protection	and	space	cannot	
be	sustained	among	Muslims	without	an	internal	transformation	of	their	own	
understandings	and	practice	of	Islam”	(p.	9).	This	may	be	described	as	his	
philosophy of re-affirming secularism for Muslim states, which I identify 
as	 the	 third	 element	 of	 his	 general	 philosophy	 on	 Islam	 and	 human	 rights.	
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It is important to bear in mind An-Na’im’s redefinition of secularism in this 
context.
To	 drive	 his	 arguments	 home,	 he	 gives	 some	 examples	 of	 the	 issue	 of	
women’s	 rights	 in	 Egypt	 and	 of	 Islamic	 identity	 in	 the	 Sudan	 and	 Iran	 to	
illustrate	that	a	“secular	space”	is	necessary	for	the	realisation	and	enjoyment	
of human rights in Muslim states. Based on those three identified elements of 
his	general	philosophy	of	Islam	and	human	rights,	An-Na’im	then	introduces	in	
this	essay,	a	theory	of	“synergy	and	interdependence”	of	religion,	human	rights	
and	secularism	by	arguing	that:	“The	synergy	and	interdependence	of	religion	
and	 human	 rights	 enable	Muslims	 to	 observe	 their	 own	 understanding	 and	
practice	of	Islam	through	an	assertion	of	human	rights,	while	using	their	Islamic	
identity	to	promote	their	human	rights	within	their	own	Muslim	communities.	
By	ensuring	that	minority	and	dissident	voices	within	a	religious	tradition	are	
able	to	challenge	dated	and	regressive	understandings	and	practices	of	Islam,	
human rights and secularism help Muslims avoid the difficult choice of either 
rejecting	 their	 religion	 entirely	 or	 abandoning	 their	 own	 human	 rights”	 (p.	
4).	His	conclusion	in	this	essay	is	to	the	effect	that	“[m]aintaining	a	dynamic	
synergy	and	interdependence	among	human	rights,	religion	and	secularism	will	
enable	all	citizens	to	live	by	their	religious	convictions	while	respecting	the	
right	of	others	to	do	the	same,	instead	of	expecting	people	to	choose	between	
competing	religions	or	religious	interpretations”	(p.	4).	He	elaborates	further	
on	this	theory	of	synergy	in	the	concluding	essay	in	this	volume.9
The	 essay,	 “Islam	 and	Human	 Rights:	 Beyond	 the	Universality	 Debate”,	
first published in 2000, rounds up the part on Islam between universality and 
secularism	and	takes	us	back	to	the	issue	of	universality.	Certainly,	universality	
of	human	rights	is	only	a	means	to	an	end	and	not	an	end	in	itself.	An-Na’im	
begins	the	essay	by	acknowledging	that	the	“implementation	of	international	
human	 rights	 norms	 in	 any	 society	 requires	 thoughtful	 and	 well-informed	
engagement of religion (broadly defined) because of its strong influence on 
human	belief	systems	and	behaviour,	regardless	of	the	formal	characterization	
of	the	relationship	between	religion	and	the	state	in	any	society”	(p.	9)	and	
that	“religious	considerations	are	too	important	for	the	majority	of	people	for	
human	 rights	 scholars	and	advocates	 to	continue	 to	dismiss	 them	simply	as	
irrelevant, insignificant, or problematic” (p. 95). In relation to the universality 
debate,	he	then	raises	the	question	of	“whether	the	secular	Western	origin	of	
human rights, as defined by the UDHR, necessarily mean that these rights are 
not	(or	cannot	be)	truly	universal”	(p.	96).	He	then	proceeds	to	try	and	answer	
that	“key	question”	in	relation	to	Islam	and	Islamic	societies.	He	restates	his	
theory	of	synergy	by	indicating	the	need	to	understand	the	synergy	between	
internal	discourse	and	cross-cultural	dialogue	 in	 the	universality	debate	and	
9	 See	Chapter6	in	this	volume.
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concludes,	 inter alia,	 that	 “universality	 of	 human	 rights	 must	 be	 realized	
through	 the	 implementation	of	 deliberate	 strategies	 that	 are	 likely	 to	 attract	
popular	support,	instead	of	on	the	basis	of	assumptions	that	such	universality	
already	exists,	or	can	be	achieved	by	proclamation	in	international	documents”	
(pp.	00–0)	alone.
II. Islam and Human Rights in the Muslim World
Today,	the	Muslim	world	may	be	perceived	narrowly	in	the	geographical	sense	
of	modern	Muslim	states	or	broadly	 in	a	diasporic	sense	 to	 include	Muslim	
peoples	 living	 as	 minorities	 in	 different	 non-Muslim	 states	 worldwide.	 In	
either	case,	the	relationship	between	Islam	and	human	rights	is	often	an	issue.	
In the five essays in this part An-Na’im addresses, respectively, some of the 
problems	 regarding	 Islam	 and	 human	 rights	 in	 the	 Muslim	 world	 both	 in	
relation	to	Muslim	states	and	in	relation	to	Muslim	minorities	living	in	non-
Muslim	states.	
This	part	starts	with	the	essay,	“Human	Rights	in	the	Muslim	World:	Socio-
Political Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives”, which was first published in 
990.	In	this	essay	An-Na’im	presents	a	preliminary	enquiry	on	the	practice	
of	human	rights	in	the	Muslim	world	in	the	geographic	sense.	The	essay	starts	
by defining the Shari’a	 as	 a	 historical	 formulation	 of	 Islamic	 religious	 law	
and	acknowledges	its	legitimising	role	in	Muslim	states.	An-Na’im	reiterates	
his	argument	on	the	need	for	the	cultural	legitimacy	for	human	rights	stating	
that human rights violations in a particular society is often a reflection of “the 
lack	 or	 weakness	 of	 cultural	 legitimacy	 of	 international	 standards	 in	 [that]	
society”	and	 that	as	 long	as	“these	standards	are	perceived	 to	be	alien	 to	or	
at	variance	with	the	values	and	institutions	of	a	people,	 they	are	unlikely	to	
elicit	commitment	of	compliance”.	He	therefore	asserts	 that	 the	“underlying	
causes	of	any	lack	or	weakness	of	legitimacy	of	human	rights	standards	must	
be	addressed	in	order	to	enhance	the	promotion	and	protection	of	human	rights	
in	that	society”	(p.	).	
With	regard	to	Islam	and	human	rights	 in	Muslim	states,	he	observes	that	
Muslims	have	recently	been	challenging	“the	gradual	weakening	of	Shari’a	as	
the	basis	for	their	formal	legal	systems”,	which	has	led	to	“mounting	demands	
for	the	immediate	application	of	Shari’a	as	the	sole,	or	at	least	primary,	legal	
system of the land” in many Muslim countries (p. 20). He however identifies 
that there are obvious conflicts between historical Shari’a	and	certain	human	
rights,	especially	women’s	rights	and	the	rights	of	non-Muslims,	and	indicates	
the need to focus on how those areas of conflict could be resolved. He emphasises 
that	“a	modern	version	of	Islamic	law	can	and	should	be	developed”,	which	
would	be	 the	modern	Shari’a,	arguing	that	such	“a	modern	“Shari’a”	could	
xxiiiAbdullahi An-Na’im
be	…	 entirely	 consistent	 with	 current	 standards	 of	 human	 rights”	 (p.	 ).	
However,	part	of	the	problem,	in	An-Na’im’s	view,	is	that	only	a	tiny	minority	
of	Muslims	appreciate	this,	and	that	 the	overwhelming	majority	of	Muslims	
today,	still	view	“historical	Shari’a”	as	the	sole	valid	interpretation	of	Islam	
that	ought	to	prevail	over	all	other	laws	and	policies.	He	also	points	out	the	
fact	 that	 the	 relationship	between	 Islam	and	human	 rights	 in	Muslim	 states	
is not only influenced by the historical scriptural imperatives of the Shari’a	
but	 also	by	political	 and	 sociological	 considerations	 in	most	Muslim	states.	
He	illustrates	the	political	factors	with	examples	of	Muslim	countries	such	as	
Pakistan,	Indonesia,	Iran,	Saudi	Arabia,	Egypt	and	Morocco.	With	regard	to	the	
sociological	factors,	he	provides	examples	on	the	different	classes	of	Islamic	
activists in different Muslim states and how they influence social attitudes and 
behaviour	and	also	states	the	relevant	counter-arguments	and	counter-methods	
against	the	approaches	of	the	different	activists.	Against	that	background,	he	
again	presents	case	studies	on	the Shari’a	and	women’s	rights	in	its	different	
contexts	 citing	 practical	 examples	 from	 some	 of	 the	 Muslim	 states	 earlier	
discussed	in	the	essay.
Finally,	 An-Na’im	 addresses	 the	 issue	 of	 Islamic	 reform	 and	 highlights	
again	his	preference	 for	 the	 reform	methodology	of	his	 late	mentor	Ustadh	
Mahmoud	Mohamed	Taha	in	that	regard.	He	argues	that	“the	proposal	is	not	
as	radical	as	it	may	seem	because	the	proposed	new	rule	would	also	be	based	
on	the	Qur’an	and	Suuna,	albeit	on	a	new	interpretation	of	the	text”	(p.	49).	
He	however	notes	that	“the	proposed	reform	will	probably	be	resisted	because	
it	 challenges	 the	 vested	 interests	 of	 powerful	 forces	 in	 the	 Muslim	 world	
and	may	 upset	male-dominated	 traditional	 political	 and	 social	 institutions”.	
He	 therefore	 states	 that	 “the	 acceptance	 and	 implementation	 of	 this	 reform	
methodology	will	 involve	a	political	struggle	within	Muslim	nations	as	part	
of	a	larger	general	struggle	for	human	rights”.	Based	on	his	conviction	of	“the	
extreme	 importance	of	 Islamic	 legitimacy	 in	Muslim	 societies”	he	not	only	
urges	“[Muslim]	human	rights	advocates	to	claim	the	Islamic	platform	and	not	
concede	it	to	the	traditionalists	and	fundamentalist	forces	in	their	societies”	but	
“also	invite[s]	outside	supporters	of	Muslim	human	rights	advocates	to	express	
their	support	with	due	sensitivity	and	genuine	concern	for	Islamic	legitimacy	
in	the	Muslim	world”	(p.	0).
The	 seventh	 essay,	 “Civil	Rights	 in	 the	 Islamic	Constitutional	Traditions:	
Shared Ideals and Divergent Regimes” was first published in 1992. In it An-
Na’im	presents	“an	internal	critique	of	civil	rights	in	the	Islamic	constitutional	
tradition	 in	 the	 modern	 context”	 (pp.	 67–8).	 He	 restates	 his	 previous	
conviction	from	the	beginning	that	“Muslim	people	have	the	right	to	conduct	
their	constitutional	and	legal	affairs	in	conformity	with	the	principles	of	Islam”	
but	also	emphasises	that	this	must	be	“subject	to	the	obligation	of	respecting	
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the	legitimate	rights	of	all	 individuals	and	groups	within	Islamic	countries”.	
He then asserts that his task “as a Muslim” is “to seek ways of fulfilling this 
obligation	 from	 an	 Islamic	 point	 of	 view”	 (p.	 68).	While	 he	 argues	 that	
“various	 normative	 traditions	may	 legitimately	 pursue	 different	 approaches	
to	 realizing	 the	 shared	 ideals	 of	 human	 dignity,	 liberty	 and	well-being”	 he	
notes	 that	 “these	 approaches	 must	 remain	 open	 to	 criticism	 and	 reform	 in	
order	 to	 ensure	 and	 improve	 their	 practical	 ability	 to	 realize	 these	 ideals”	
(p.	69).	In	relation	to	the	Muslim	world,	he	suggests	that	the	“key	to	conducting	
constructive	discourse	about	civil	rights	in	the	Islamic	constitutional	tradition	
…is	 the	 candid	 admission	 of	 the	 historical	 contradictions	 and	 ambivalence	
inherent	 to	 the	 subject	 itself,	 and	 an	 appreciation	 of	 the	 underlying	 causes	
thereof”	(p.	70).	He	then	proceeds	to	address	the	challenge	of	realizing	the	
shared	ideals,	commencing	with	the	observation	that	“the	pursuit	of	the	ideals	
of	dignity,	liberty	and	well-being	is	universal	to	all	human	societies”	but	that	
the	matter	 is,	however,	complicated	“by	 the	fact	 that	perceptions	of	dignity,	
permissible	limitations	on	liberty	and	the	conditions	believed	to	be	conducive	
to	well-being	vary	from	one	society	to	another”	(p.	7).	Thus,	in	his	view	this	
challenge	can	be	addressed	“only	if	the	proposed	approach	is	appreciative	of,	
and	sensitive	to,	global	cultural	diversity	in	relation	to	the	precepts,	institutions	
and	mechanisms	of	civil	rights”.	He	therefore	reiterates	 that	“the	need	for	a	
civil	rights	regime	in	a	given	state	society	must	be	legitimized	and	rooted	in	
the	local	culture(s)	of	that	society”	(p.	7).	
An-Na’im	then	examines	the	origins	and	development	of	Islamic	constitutional	
theory	 through	a	critical	analysis	of	 the	constitutional	 theory	of	 the	Medina	
state,	 the	 evolution	 and	 present	 status	 of	 Islamic	 constitutional	 theory,	 and	
Islamic	constitutionalism	in	the	modern	context.	He	also	discusses	the	issue	of	
civil	rights	in	modern	Islamic	constitutional	theory	under	which	he	addresses	
the	issue	of	Shari’a	and	civil	rights,	highlighting	the	issue	of	women’s	rights,	
the	rights	of	non-Muslims,	and	civil	rights	in	the	present	Muslim	world.	He	
illustrates	his	arguments	in	that	regard	with	examples	from	different	Muslim	
states	to	ultimately	show	that	the	relationship	between	[historical]	Shari’a	and	
civil	rights	is	negative,	especially	in	relation	to	the	civil	rights	of	women	and	
non-Muslims.	He	however	notes	that	despite	the	“apparently	poor	status	of	civil	
rights	in	Islamic	countries”	he	does	“not	believe	that	the	situation	is	hopeless”	
(p.	9).	He	maintains	“that	Islam	can	and	should	still	be	used	as	a	valuable	
cultural	 resource	 to	 legitimize	and	enhance	civil	 rights	 in	 Islamic	societies”	
(p.	 9)	 reiterating	 that	 “the	 struggle	 for	 civil	 rights	 in	 Islamic	 countries	
should	utilize	the	processes	of	internal	discourse	and	cross-cultural	dialogue	to	
realize	the	shared	ideals	of	dignity,	liberty	and	well-being	for	all”	(p.	9).	His	
conclusion	in	this	essay	is	that:	“While	it	is	true	that	modern	formulations	of	
civil	rights	emerged	from	the	Western	liberal	tradition,	their	underlying	values	
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of	dignity,	liberty	and	well-being	are	shared	by	Islamic	societies”	and	that	“[i]n	
adopting	modern	civil	rights	regimes,	and	adapting	them	to	their	own	cultures	
and	circumstances,	Islamic	societies	are	merely	responding	to	the	challenge	of	
realizing	ideals	they	already	share	in	the	modern	context”	(p.	9).
The	eighth	essay,	“Human	Rights	in	the	Arab	World:	A	Regional	Perspective”	
was first published in 2001. Here, An-Na’im argues that “the wide variety of 
strategies	for	the	effective	and	sustainable	protection	of	[human]	rights	should	
always be determined and implemented in specific local, regional and global 
context”	(p.	70).	He	notes	that	his	particular	concern	in	this	essay	is	“with	
identifying	 and	 promoting	 ways	 of	 diminishing,	 and	 eventfully	 breaking”	
what	 he	 calls	 “human	 rights	 dependency”	 (p.	 70)	 of	 developing	 countries	
on	 international	 pressure	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 human	 rights	 of	 	 their	 own	
people. He identifies the different problems associated with “human rights 
dependency”	 of	 developing	 countries	 and	 proceeds	 to	 engage	 with	 those	
problems.	 He	 restates	 his	 consistent	 position	 that	 “moral	 or	 philosophical	
justifications for the universality of human rights can be found in all major 
religious	 and	 cultural	 traditions	 of	 the	world,	which	 should	 be	 emphasized	
through	an	 internal	discourse	within	each	 tradition	 that	also	addresses	 those	
features	of	the	religion	or	culture	which	are	negative	or	hostile	to	human	rights	
norms”	(p.	70).	
In	 relation	 to	 the	 Arab	 world,	 he	 observes	 that	 “[w]hile	 Islam	 is	 often	
assumed	to	be	a	major	factor	 in	 the	presumed	unity	of	‘Arab	culture’,	 there	
are	 some	 strong	 differences	 in	 the	 way	 it	 is	 understood	 and	 practiced	 in	
various	parts	of	the	region,	especially	in	terms	of	its	relationship	to	the	state	
and	public	life,	from	Tunisia	to	Saudi	Arabia,	and	from	Somalia	to	Syria	and	
Iraq”	(p.	707).	He	therefore	observes	the	need	for	a	“clear	appreciation	of	the	
complexity	of	 interests,	as	well	as	 the	diversity	of	factors	and	contexts,	 that	
condition	the	policy	and	practice	of	each	Arab	state,	especially	regarding	the	
protection	of	human	rights”	and	more	particularly	 in	 respect	of	“the	 impact	
of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Arab nationalism(s), and political Islam on the 
current	 status	and	 future	prospects	of	 the	protection	of	human	 rights	 in	 this	
region”. He notes that “since these factors have been cited as justification 
or	explanation	of	human	rights	violations	at	various	 times	 in	different	Arab	
countries,	 they	 should	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 in	 any	 analysis	 of	 the	 current	
status,	and	assessment	of	future	prospects”	(p.	708).	The	essay	then	proceeds	
to	address	relevant	issues	such	as	governmental	action,	the	Arab	League,	and	
non-governmental	organizations	(NGOs).	In	respect	of	the	latter,	he	observes	
that “Arab human rights NGOs are consistently denied official registration and 
face	systematic	harassment	by	the	majority	of	the	governments	of	the	region”	
and	 that	 this	 is	 true	both	of	 “traditionalist	purportedly	 Islamic	governments	
like	those	of	the	Gulf	states	and	Saudi	Arabia	or	so-called	secular	governments	
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like	 those	 of	 Iraq,	 Syria	 and	 Libya”	 (p.	 7).	 In	 analysing	 the	 conceptual	
difficulties, he notes that a particular troubling difficulty to the Arab human 
rights	movement	is	“the	strong	emergence	of	Islamic	activism	during	the	last	
two	decades”	(p.	79)	and	the	consequent	problem	of	“how	to	deal	with	Islamist	
and	other	militant	ideological	groups	which	seek	to	manipulate	the	processes	
of	democratization	and	protection	of	human	rights	in	order	to	seize	political	
power	without	genuine	commitment	to	these	values”	(p.	74).	He	notes	also	
that	“the	personal	background	of	 the	secular	Arab	 intellectuals	who	became	
leaders	of	human	rights	organizations	is	not	conducive	to	open	dialogue	with	
the	 leaders	 of	 the	 Islamic	 groups”	 and	 that	 “these	 leaders	 of	 human	 rights	
organizations find it difficult to openly challenge calls by Islamic groups for 
the	application	of	 Islamic	Law	(Shari’a)	 for	 fear	of	being	branded	as	 ‘anti-
Islamic’	despite	the	obvious	fundamental	contradictions	between	[historical]	
Shari’a	 principles	 and	 international	 human	 rights	 norms	 on	 such	 issues	 as	
the	 rights	 of	women,	 non-Muslims	 and	 freedom	of	 belief	 among	Muslims”	
(p.	79).	An-Na’im	concludes	this	essay	philosophically	with	the	observation	
that	 the	challenge	 that	ultimately	confronts	human	 rights	 in	 the	Arab	world	
“is	how	to	be	‘visionary	yet	realistic’,	because	there	are	no	‘magic	solutions’	
that	can	materialize	immediately	for	any	of	the	obstacles	and	problems	facing	
the	 protection	 of	 human	 rights	 in	 the	Arab	world.	Because	 one	 has	 to	 take	
the	world	as	it	is,	not	as	one	would	like	it	to	be,	strategies	for	promoting	the	
protection	of	human	rights	must	take	into	account	the	deep-rooted	nature	of	the	
problems	in	devising		incremental	solutions	that	address	immediate	short	term	
needs,	while	seeking	to	achieve	long	term	ends”	(p.	7).
The	ninth	essay,	“Human	Rights	and	Islamic	Identity	in	France	and	Uzbekistan:	
Mediation of the Local and Global” was first published in 2000. It relates to the 
Muslim	world	in	the	diasporic	sense,	in	relation	to	the	human	rights	problems	
raised	by	Muslim	minorities	living	in	non-Muslim	states	and	trying	to	maintain	
their	identity	as	Muslims	in	those	states.	Here,	An-Na’im	discusses	“current	
expressions	of	Islamic	 identity	 in	Western	Europe	and	Central	Asia”	as	part	
of	his	“wider	and	continuing	concern	with	issues	of	cultural	transformation	in	
Islamic	societies	and	communities”	(p.	906).	The	importance	of	the	Muslim	
world in the diasporic sense, is reflected in An-Na’im’s reference to the fact 
that	some	“Muslim	scholars,	like	late	Fazlur	Rahman	and	Zaki	Badawi,	have	
suggested	 that	 Islamic	renewal	may	come	from	Muslims	 in	 the	West”,	with	
Zaki	 Badawi	 adding	 that	 “the	most	 profound	 formulations	will	 come	 from	
France,	where	Muslims	will	be	challenged	by	the	hardness	of	life,	the	deeply	
held	convictions	of	Republican	secularism,	and	the	depth	of	racism”	(p.	97).	
The essay focuses specifically on “the role of the human rights paradigm in the 
dynamics	of	the	formation	and	transformation	of	Islamic	identity	in	France	and	
Uzbekistan	today”.	An-Na’im	notes,	in	that	regard,	that	“despite	differences	in	
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their historical experiences and specific present context, both types of complex 
Muslim	communities	face	the	question	of	the	relationship	between	Islam	and	
the	state”	(p.	908).	
In relation to France, he identifies that local “Muslim communities are 
currently	 negotiating	 with	 the	 wider	 national	 French	 identity	 and	 culture	
about	 the	 meaning	 	 and	 relevance	 of	 their	 Islamic	 identity	 in	 the	 context	
of	 a	 highly	 developed	 and	 effective	 national	 and	 regional	European	 human	
rights	 framework”	 (p.	908).	He	observes	 in	 that	 regard	 that	major	 issues	of	
contestation	include	education,	religion,	language,	political	participation,	and	
immigration	policies.	On	the	other	hand	he	notes	that	“Uzbekistan	is	struggling	
with	the	meaning	and	relevance	of	an	Islamic	identity	in	the	context	of	a	post-
Soviet-state	 society	 that	 is	 only	 beginning	 to	 discover	 the	 possibilities	 and	
benefits of a human rights framework” (p. 909). Thus, An-Na’im asserts the 
need	 for	Muslims	 to	 “adopt	 a	 human	 rights	 paradigm	 (including	 its	 norms	
and	institutions	and	its	popular	advocacy)	in	order	more	effectively	to	assert	
their	 Islamic	 identity”	 (p.	 940)	 but	 in	 doing	 so	 he	 argues	 that	 “Muslims	 in	
France	and	Uzbekistan	may have to modify aspects of their understanding of 
what an Islamic identity means in the process of claiming that identity in the 
modern context”	 (emphasis	not	mine).	He	 reiterates	again	 in	 this	 essay	 that	
“for	the	universalist	human	rights	project	of	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	
century	to	succeed	…it	needs	to	engage	possibilities	of	internal	discourse	and	
cross-cultural	dialogue	in	promoting	its	own	normative	legitimacy	as	well	as	
its political and legal efficacy” (p. 910). He also discourses the complexities 
of	 identity	 formation	 and	 transformation,	 Islamic	 identity	 and	 nationality	
and	 citizenship	 in	France,	 and	 the	 politics	 of	 transformation	 in	Uzbekistan,	
respectively.	With	regard	to	France	he	argues	that	“the	human	rights	paradigm	
precludes	the	coerced	assimilation	of	migrant	populations	into	French	culture	
and	nationality	in	the	traditional	sense”,	which	he	notes	“forces	an	adjustment	
of	dominant	understandings	of	what	 it	means	 to	be	French”.	He	also	notes,	
however,	that	“immigrant	Muslims	will	also	have	to	adjust	their	understandings	
of	what	 it	means	 to	 be	 a	Muslim	 precisely	 in	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 claim	 an	
Islamic	 identity	 in	France”	 (p.	97).	With	 regard	 to	Uzbekistan	he	analyses	
the	“role	of	Islam	in	the	social	and	political	transformation	of	the	country	in	
the	post	Soviet	era,	while	highlighting	some	features	that	may	be	relevant	to	
an	assessment	of	 the	possibilities	 and	 limitations	of	using	 the	human	 rights	
paradigm	 in	mediating	 Islamic	 identity	 in	 that	 country”	 (p.	9).	The	essay	
then	examines	 the	 relationship	between	Islam	and	culture	and	considers	 the	
“possible	role	of	the	human	rights	paradigm	in	the	transformation	of	Islamic	
identity	in	these	two	countries”	(p.	9).	
In	conclusion	An-Na’im	appreciates	that	“it	may	appear	paradoxical	to	say	
that	Muslims,	or	any	other	religious	or	ethnic	group	for	that	matter,	will	have	
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to	accept	the	incorporation	of	an	external	normative	system,	namely,	universal	
human	 rights	 standards	 and	 institutions,	 into	 their	 own	 identity	 in	 order	 to	
claim	that	identity.	However,	the	paradox	is	resolved	or	mediated	to	the	extent	
that	Muslims	 are	 active	 actors	 in	 (not	 merely	 subjects	 of)	 the	 articulation,	
interpretation,	 and	 implementation	 of	 human	 rights”	 and	 that	 the	 “human	
rights	paradigm	is	necessary	for	the	formation	and	transformation	of	Islamic	
identity”.	He	closes	his	arguments	by	stating	that	“Muslims	have	a	choice	in	
either	rejecting	this	imperative	paradigm	as	‘alien’	to	their	cultures	or	accepting	
it	as	integral	to	those	cultures	in	today’s	interdependent	world”	(p.	94).
Often,	when	 discussing	 the	 relationship	 between	 Islam	 and	 human	 rights	
in	Muslim	 societies,	 the	 important	 role	 of	 human	 agency	 is	 often	 not	well	
highlighted	 or	 is	 forgotten	 completely.	This	 is	what	An-Na’im	 addresses	 in	
the	tenth	essay,	“The	Best	of	Times	and	the	Worst	of	Times:	Human	Agency	
and Human Rights in the Islamic Societies”. This was first published in 2004 
during very difficult times for Islam and Muslims generally, principally as a 
consequence	of	reactions	to	the	September		terrorist	attacks	in	the	United	
States	 of	 America	 in	 00.	 An-Na’im	 begins	 this	 essay	 with	 the	 premise	
that	“there	are	good	reasons	for	‘pragmatic	optimism’	about	human	rights	in	
all	 Islamic	 societies,	 precisely	 because	 they	 are	 experiencing	 multiple	 and	
profound	crises	of	unprecedented	scale	and	magnitude”	(p.	).	He	argues	that	
the	crises	confronting	Islam	and	Muslims	“are	opening	new	opportunities	for	
creative	human	agency,	which	is	the	ability	of	people	to	take	control	of	their	
own	lives	and	realize	their	own	objectives,	thereby	becoming	the	source	and	
cause	of	transformation”,	meaning	that	the	best	of	times	can	“materialize	out	
of	the	worst	of	times	through	human	agency	of	persons,	acting	individually,	
collectively	 or	 institutionally”.	 He	 states	 however	 that	 “outcomes	 are	
contingent	upon	what	Muslims	and	others	make	of	these	opportunities,	hence	
the qualification of my optimism as pragmatic, drawing on realistic prospects 
in	the	real	world	to	inspire	appropriate	action,	rather	than	simply	assuming	that	
respect	for	human	rights	will	necessarily	improve	as	a	matter	of	course”	(p.	
).	An-Na’im	emphasises	 that	we	“should	be	concerned	about	human	rights	
in	Islamic	societies	generally	in	view	of	the	fact	that	Muslims	are	estimated	
at	9.6%	of	the	total	world	population,	living	in	every	continent	and	region,	
and	constituting	the	clear	majority	of	the	population	in	44	states,	a	quarter	of	
the	total	membership	of	the	United	Nations”	which	“represent[s]		too	large	a	
proportion of the field to be overlooked by any systematic study or monitoring 
of	the	status	of	human	rights	around	the	world”	(p.	).	
With	 regard	 to	 the	 role	 of	 human	 agency,	 he	 notes	 that	 the	 question	 of	
the	 relationship	 between	 Islam	 and	 human	 rights	 “can	 be	meaningful	 only	
when	it	is	about	Muslims	not	Islam…	because	“the	question	is	always	about	
people’s	 understanding	 and	 practice	 of	 their	 religion,	 not	 the	 religion	 itself	
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as	an	abstract	notion,	and	about	human	rights	as	a	living	and	evolving	body	
of	 principles	 and	 rule,	 not	 as	 a	 theoretical	 concept”.	He	 argues	 further	 that	
“[w]hether	 regarding	 religion	or	human	rights,	 reference	 to	states,	countries	
or	international	organizations	like	the	United	Nations	is	really	to	people	who	
control	 the	 state	 apparatus,	 inhabit	 a	 country	 or	work	 through	 international	
institutions”,	and		that	“[w]hether	institutions	and	organizations	are	religious,	
political	or	diplomatic,	the	question	about	their	relationship	to	human	rights	is	
always	about	how	people	negotiate	power,	justice,	and	pragmatic	self-interest,	
at	home	and	abroad”	(p.	).	Thus,	in	relation	to	Islam,	he	argues	on	the	one	
hand	that	through	a	proper	use	of	human	agency,	“the	attitudes	and	practice	
of	Muslims	…	 can	 change	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 equal	 human	 rights	 of	women	
and	 non-Muslims	 through	 internal	 debate	within	 present	 Islamic	 societies”,	
but	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 he	 also	 notes	 importantly	 that	 “the	manner	 in	which	
Muslims	are	likely	to	interact	with	human	rights	will	be	conditioned	by	such	
factors	as	what	other	societies	are	doing	about	the	same	issues”.	In	his	view,	
“Muslim	responses	are	likely	to	be	affected	by	whether	they	perceive	that	they	
are	 required	 to	 ‘prove’	 their	 allegiance	 to	 the	human	 rights	 paradigm	while	
others	are	not	expected	or	required	to	do	so”	and	that	“Muslims	are	more	likely	
to	resist	commitment	to	these	rights	when	they	are	presented	as	being	alone	
in	 struggling	with	 the	 principle,	while	 the	 commitment	 of	 other	 cultural	 or	
religious	traditions	is	taken	for	granted”	(p.	4).	He	then	strongly	condemns	both	
the	terrorists	attacks	of	September		00	as	well	as	the	unilateral	military	
retaliation	by	the	United	States	describing	the	United	States’	occupation	of	Iraq	
in 2003 as a “colonial venture” which by definition is “the usurpation of the 
sovereignty of a people by military conquest without legal justification” as  well 
as a “reckless and unaccountable invasion and occupation was neither justified 
by	self-defense	principles	nor	authorized	by	the	Security	Council	of	the	United	
Nations”	 (p.	).	He	however	 raises	a	challenge	 to	Muslim	societies	arguing	
as	a	Muslim	himself	that	a	“critical	part	of	that	process	in	the	present	global	
context	is	to	confront	terrorism	within	our	own	societies,	as	it	is	ultimately	a	
challenge	to	our	human	decency	and	responsibility	for	what	we	do,	or	is	done	
on	our	behalf	or	 in	our	name,	with	our	approval	or	acquiescence”.	He	adds	
that	“Terrorism	could	not	exist	or	thrive	as	it	does	at	present	if	we	have	not	
somehow	supported	or	encouraged	it,	at	least	by	our	indifference	to	the	broader	
phenomenon	of	political	violence	and	its	underlying	causes”	(p.	7).	He	argues	
further	that	“[n]either	the	terrorist	attacks	nor	the	American	retaliation	could	
have	happened	without	 the	 support	 of	 a	wider	 constituency	on	each	 side,	 a	
much wider circle of complicity for having justified, condoned or facilitated 
those	acts	of	violence”	(p.	9).
In	 relation	 to	 human	 rights,	 he	 asserts	 that	 “Muslims	must	 exercise	 their	
human agency in choosing peaceful co-existence and mediation of conflict 
Abdullahi An-Na’imxxx
over	 the	 arbitrary	 and	 indiscriminate	 use	 of	 violence	 to	 achieve	 political	
objectives”	 (p.	 8).	Thus	he	notes	 that	 despite	 the	 “worst	 of	 times”	 scenario	
confronting	Muslim	societies,	 “this	 is	 also	 the	 ‘best	of	 times’	 for	a	positive	
engagement	 of	 international	 legality	 and	 peaceful	 co-existence”	 and	 that	
among	the	many	lessons	and	insights	that	can	be	drawn	by	all	societies	from	
the	 atrocities	 of	 September	 	 is	 what	 he	 describes	 as	 “our	 shared	 human	
vulnerability	–	the	recognition	that	all	human	beings	everywhere	are	vulnerable	
to	arbitrary	violence”	 (p.	8).	Against	 this	background,	An-Na’im	 then	notes	
that	the	relationship	between	Islam	and	human	rights	“is	open	to	engagement	
and	transformation	precisely	because	it	is	contingent	on	an	interactive	web	of	
internal	and	external	factors	and	forces”	and	that	“[l]ike	other	major	religious	
and	cultural	traditions,	Islam	provides	a	basis	for	upholding	human	rights	and	
dignity	through	its	own	account	of	what	it	means	to	be	human”.	He	however	
contends	that	“these	dimensions	of	the	Islamic	traditions	(in	the	plural)	should	
be seen as open to critical reflection and reformulation among the believers 
themselves,	because	of	 the	inherent	and	permanent	diversity	of	 the	tradition	
itself.	There	are	not	only	similarities	as	well	as	variations	in	perceptions	and	
practices	of	human	rights	and	dignity	among	Muslims	and	Islamic	societies,	
but	 also	 possibilities	 of	 change	 in	 relevant	 attitudes	 and	 practices”	 (pp.	 9–
0).	He	concludes	inter alia	that	the	point	“is	simply	to	say	that	the	practical	
relevance	and	utility	of	the	social	order	of	Islam	are	contingent	upon	human	
understanding and practice, which testifies to its ability to provide for the 
practical	needs	of	its	adherents.	This	point	is	critical	for	the	theological	basis	of	
the	relationship	between	Islam	and	human	rights	today”	and	that	“these	are	the	
best of times and the worst of times for Muslims, with infinite possibilities in 
either	direction,	dependent	on	the	way	we	all	use	or	abuse	our	human	agency”	
(p.	).
III. Some Topical Issues in Islam and Human Rights Discourse
Within the general theme of Islam and human rights, there are specific 
substantive	topical	issues	that	usually	feature	prominently	in	the	discourse.	In	
the five essays contained in this part of the book, An-Na’im addresses some 
of	those	topical	substantive	issues,	namely,	the	questions	of	apostasy,	religious	
minorities,	women’s	rights,	freedom	of	expression	and jihad, respectively. 
The	part	opens	with	the	eleventh	essay,	“The	Islamic	Law	of	Apostasy	and	
its Modern Applicability: A Case from The Sudan”, first published in 1986. 
The	traditional	Islamic	law	on	apostasy	is	a	very	controversial	issue	in	relation	
to	the	right	to	freedom	of	thought,	conscience	and	religion	under	international	
human	rights	law.	Article	8	of	the	UDHR	provides	that	the	right	to	freedom	of	
thought,	conscience	and	religion	“includes	freedom	to	change	[one’s]	religion	
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or	belief”,	which	was	one	of	the	reasons	for	Saudi	Arabia’s	abstention	from	
the	 adoption	 of	 the	UDHR	 in	 948	 on	 the	 ground	 that	 this	 contradicts	 the	
prohibition	and	punishment	of	 apostasy	under	 traditional	 Islamic	 law.0	An-
Na’im	notes	 that	 the	 tension	between	 faith	and	 legalism	 is	most	obvious	 in	
the	classical	Shari’a	ruling	on	apostasy.	He	addresses	this	tension	against	the	
background	of	the	execution	of	his	mentor	Ustadh	Mahmoud	Muhammad	Taha	
by	the	Sudanese	military	regime	under	President	Ja’far	Numeri	on	8	January	
98	for	the	alleged	offence	of	apostasy	among	other	charges	under	Sudanese	
state	law.	He	argues	that	the	“real	importance	of	Ustadh	Mahmoud’s	trial	and	
execution	is	in	the	questions	it	raises	about	the	place	of	[historical]	Shari’a	in	
the	modern	world”	especially	“the	relation	between	sincere	Muslim	belief	and	
compliance	with	laws	purporting	to	be	derived	from	that	belief”.	In	his	view,	
a	candid	admission	by	Muslims	of	this	element	of	religious	intolerance	under	
[historical]	Shari’a	is	“an	essential	prerequisite	for	the	success	of	any	attempt	
to	secure	complete	respect	for	freedom	of	religion	under	Islamic	law	and	in	
Muslim	states”.	Through	 this	essay,	he	hoped	 to	contribute	“to	 the	building	
of	a	theological,	philosophical	and	legal	case	for	religious	freedom	in	Islam”	
(p.	97).	
The	essay	starts	with	a	detailed	legal,	political	and	religious	background	to	the	
Mahmoud	Taha	case	in	the	Sudan	before	analysing	the	traditional	Islamic	law	
of	apostasy.	An-Na’im	then	argues	that	it	is	a	“fact	that	the	traditional	Islamic	
law	of	apostasy	is	not	only	liable	to	be	abused,	but	that	it	is	a	also	inherently	
in	 contradiction	 with	more	 universally	 accepted	 standards	 of	 constitutional	
civil	 liberties	 and	 international	 human	 rights”.	 He	 asserts	 strongly	 that	 the	
“case	of	Ustadh	Mahmoud	in	the	Sudan	cannot,	unfortunately,	be	dismissed	
as	an	isolated	and	curious	example	of	despotic	and	oppressive	brutality”	but	
a	genuine	question	of	Islamic	law	that	“confronts	Muslims	all	over	the	world	
with	 very	 real	 and	 fundamental	 questions”	 (p.	 ).	 He	 then	 analyses	 the	
traditional	legal	basis	of	the	offence	under	Islamic	law	and	its	civil	and	human	
rights	implications	in	modern	times.	He	examines	and	critiques	the	different	
approaches advanced by different modernist Muslim scholars and identifies 
what,	in	his	view	are	the	shortcomings	of	each	of	those	approaches.	In	the	end	
he	again	proposes	Ustadh	Mahmoud	Taha’s	approach	as	a	new	approach	and	
best	method	for	dealing	with	 the	 issue	of	apostasy	under	 traditional	 Islamic	
law	in	relation	to	the	right	to	freedom	of	religion	under	modern	international	
human	rights	law.
0	 The	 prohibition	 and	 punishment	 of	 apostasy	 under	 traditional	 Islamic	 law	 is	
currently	 a	 hotly	 debated	 issue	 amongst	 contemporary	 Muslim	 scholars.	 See e.g.	
M.	Baderin,	 International Human Rights and Islamic Law	 (Oxford:	OUP,	00)	pp.	
–;	S.	El-Awa,	Punishment in Islamic Law	(Indianapolis:	IIIT,	98)	pp.	0–6;	
M.	H.	Kamali,	Freedom of Expression in Islam	(Cambridge:	ITS,	997)	pp.	87–07.
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The	 twelfth	 essay,	 “Religious	 Minorities	 under	 Islamic	 Law	 and	 the	
Limits of Cultural Relativism” was first published in 1987. In it An-Na’im 
addresses	the	issue	of	religious	minorities	under	Islamic	law	within	the	context	
of	 cultural	 relativistivism	 in	 human	 rights	 discourse.	 He	 begins	 with	 the	
argument	that,	“Non-Muslim	minorities	within	an	Islamic	state	do	not	enjoy	
rights	equal	 to	 those	of	 the	Muslim	majority”.	He	also	notes	 that	“although	
most	of	the	constitutions	of	modern	Muslim	states	guarantee	against	religious	
discrimination,	most	 of	 these	 constitutions	 also	 authorize	 the	 application	of	
Shari’ah”	which,	 he	 argues	 is	 contradictory	 and	 raises	 important	 questions	
for urgent and candid discussion. He first anticipates and counteracts what he 
identifies as “possible arguments which may be used to justify or rationalize 
the	 inferior	status	of	 religious	minorities	under	Shari’ah”	(p.	).	The	article	
then	provides	an	extensive	analysis	of	cultural	 relativism	and	human	rights,	
whereby	 he	 discusses	 the	 importance	 of	 cultural	 considerations	 to	 the	
development	of	human	rights,	thereby	restating	his	erstwhile	philosophy	that	
“the	implementation	of	the	international	human	rights	standards	will	improve	
if	they	can	be	shown	to	be	the	natural	and	legitimate	evolution	of	the	cultural	
tradition	of	the	particular	community”,	on	grounds	that	the	genesis	of	human	
rights	norms	“can	be	found	in	almost	all	major	cultural	traditions”	(p.	).	He	
however	notes,	importantly,	that	emphasizing	“the	need	for	cultural	contribution	
and	legitimacy…	does	not	mean	that	we	should	concede	the	claim	to	extreme	
cultural	 relativism	 that	 there	 are	 no	 universal	 standards	 of	 human	 rights”,	
arguing	that	to	do	so	“would	defeat	the	purpose	of	cultural	relativism	itself”	
(p.	4).	He	then	goes	on	to	discuss	the	universal	nature	of	the	rights	of	religious	
minorities	by	analysing	relevant	human	rights	instruments	and	constitutional	
provisions,	including	those	of	Muslim	states,	that	guarantee	this	right.	
Against	 that	 background,	An-Na’im	 then	 discusses	 the	 issue	 of	 religious	
minorities	 under	 Shari’ah,	 observing	 that	 traditional	 Shari’ah	 must	 be	
understood	in	the	context	of	the	prevailing	period	of	its	development	and	that	
“now	 that	 the	problems	have	changed,	 and	 the	historical	 answers	 ceased	 to	
be	valid	…	new	answers	must	be	developed	out	of	the	Qur’an	and	Sunnah”,	
which	are	the	main	sources	of	Islamic	law,	and	that	those	new	answers	“would	
be	the	Islamic	Shari’ah	of	today”	rather	than	the	historical	Shari’ah. To find 
new answers to the issue of religious minorities in Muslim states, he first 
outlines	the	historical	Shari’ah	positions	on	the	issue	and	argues	that	were	we	
to	apply	those	historical	Shari’ah principles	“to	a	modern	nation-state,	such	
as Sudan, we [will] find that the human rights implications are very serious 
indeed”	(p.	).	He	also	cites	the	constitutional	provisions	of	Iran	and	points	
out	that	the	“constitutional	manifestations	of	Shari’ah [therein]	are	obviously	
radically	inconsistent	with	the	universal	human	rights	of	religious	minorities	
outlined”	earlier	 in	 the	essay	 (p.	).	He	also	mentions	other	Muslim	states	
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that	constitutionally	declare	Islam	as	the	religion	of	the	state	and	Shari’ah	as	
a	main	source	of	legislation.	He	states	that	the	argument	of	cultural	relativism	
can	never	be	allowed	to	go	so	far	as	allowing	for	the	discrimination	against	
religious	minorities	sanctioned	under	historical	Shari’ah.	
He	however	states	clearly	in	this	article	that	he	believes	“Islamic	Shari’ah	
can	be	reformed	from	the	fundamental	sources	of	Islam	to	fully	accommodate	
and	 even	 contribute	 to	 the	 further	 development	 of	 the	 current	 universal	
standards”	and	then	proceeds	to	outline	“one	way	in	which	Shari’ah	can	be	
brought	into	full	accord	with	universal	human	rights”	particularly	the	rights	of	
religious minorities (p. 14). He argues in the end that “it is my firm conviction 
that	Shari’ah	 has	 developed	 in	 the	 only	way	 it	 should,	 and	 could	 possibly,	
have	 developed	 in	 that	 historical	 context”	 and	 that	 the	 “early	 jurists…did	
an	excellent	 job	and	succeeded	in	serving	the	needs	and	aspirations	of	 their	
community	for	centuries”	but	that	“by	the	same	token	…	it	should	be	open	to	
modern	Muslim	jurists	to	state	and	interpret	the	law	for	their	contemporaries	
even	if	such	statement	and	interpretation	were	to	be,	in	some	respects,	different	
from	the	inherited	wisdom”	(pp.	6–7).	He	then	makes	propositions	for	such	
new	interpretations	based,	again,	on	the	work	of	his	mentor	Ustdah	Mahmoud	
Taha.	He	asserts	in	his	conclusion	that	“[s]ince	the	Muslims	cannot,	and	should	
not,	 be	 allowed	 to	 justify	 discrimination	 against	 and	 persecution	 of	 non-
Muslims	on	the	basis	of	Islamic	cultural	norms,	the	Muslims	themselves	must	
seek	ways	of	reconciling	Shari’ah	with	fundamental	human	rights”	(p.	8).
The	thirteenth	essay,	“The	Rights	of	Women	and	International	Law	in	the	
Muslim Context” was first published in 1987. In it, An-Na’im discusses “some 
aspects	of	the	relationship	between	[historical]	Shari’a	and	current	international	
standards on the rights of women” (p. 492). The essay first analyses the main 
principles	of	Shari’ah	on	 the	rights	of	women	both	 in	 the	historical	context	
and	in	view	of	the	“likely	re-establishment	of	Shari’a	in	the	public	domain”	of	
modern	Muslim	states	(p.	49).	He	starts	with	an	analysis	of	the	theory	of	the	
rights	of	women	under	the Shari’ah, identifying	that	“[f]rom	its	very	beginning	
in	the	seventh	century,	Shari’a	guaranteed	all	Muslim	women	an	independent	
legal	 personality,	 including	 the	 capacity	 to	 hold	 and	 dispose	 of	 property	 in	
their own right, a specific share in inheritance, access to education… and 
some	participation	 in	public	 life”	 (p.	49).	He	notes	 that	while	“[t]his	 level	
of	achievement		may	not	appear	impressive	by	some	modern	standards,	…	it	
has made very significant improvements in women’s rights when viewed in 
historical	perspectives”,	thereby	reaching	the	conclusion	that	“Shari’a	on	the	
rights	of	women,	…	compares	very	 favourably	with	any	other	 legal	 system	
until	the	nineteenth	century”	(p.	49).	
He	however	argues	that	“A	historical	perspective	is	a	poor	excuse	for	the	current	
inferior	status	of	women	under	Shari’a	when	compared	to	other	contemporary	
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legal	 systems	 or	 when	 judged	 by	 the	 emerging	 international	 standards”	
(p.	49).	He	thus	points	out	that	this	needs	to	change,	arguing	that	“the	provisions	
of	 the	Qur’an	 and	Sunna	 on	women’s	 rights	 can	be	 interpreted	differently”	
and	that	we	should	in	fact,	“now	rely	on	this	alternative	interpretation	of	the	
Qur’an	and	Sunna	in	the	reformation	of	Shari’a	on	the	rights	of	women”.	He	
warns	however	that	“[t]he	possibility	of	an	alternative	interpretation	…	should	
not	be	confused	with	the	current	authoritative	view	of	Shari’a	as	accepted	by	
the	vast	majority	of	Muslims”	(p.	497).	In	relation	to	the	question	of	equality,	
An-Na’im		states	notably	that	“I	do	not	believe,	however,	that	complete	legal	
equality	 between	men	 and	women	 is	 achievable	 and	must	 be	 our	 objective	
in	 the	Muslim	world	 today”	but	 rather	 it	 is	 the	 ideal	of	substantive	equality	
between	men	and	women	that	must	be	realistically	pursued.	He	further	argues	
in	 that	 regard	 that	 complete	 emancipation	 of	 women	 in	 the	Muslim	world	
cannot	 be	 fully	 achieved	 through	 secular	movements	 and	 that	 the	 best	way	
to	achieve	women’s	rights	“is	 through	what	may	be	described	as	alternative	
Islamization	through	the	reformation	of	Shari’a”	(p.	00),	by	which	he	means	
“the	 assumption	 of	 an	 Islamic	 platform	 in	 advocating	 fundamental	 reform	
of	Shari’a	on	 the	rights	of	women	and	the	provision	of	Islamic	foundations	
for	these	rights”.	He	notes	that	“Islam	is	too	powerful	a	political	and	cultural	
force	to	abandon	to	fundamentalists”	and	that	“Islamic	movements	can	easily	
mobilize	mass	support	for	their	agenda	by	appealing	to	the	religious	sentiments	
and	allegiances	of	the	vast	majority	of	Muslims”,	and	that	the	“best	way	…	is	
to	show	that	the	rights	of	women	are	Islamic	and	not	alien	western	notions,	
albeit they may find expressions in other cultural and religious traditions, both 
western	and	non-western”.	He	says	this	must	be	done	internally	through	the	
adoption	of	imaginative	reform	techniques	for	the	evolution	and	reformation	
of	Shari’a	rules	relative	to	women’s	rights”	(p.	0).	
The	essay	then	provides	an	analysis	of	women’s	rights	under	international	
law	and	Muslim	reactions	to	those	international	standards.	He	illustrates	his	
arguments	with	examples	of	the	practices	of	some	Muslim	states	and	concludes	
with	a	discussion	of	his	proposed	approach	to	solving	the	problem	of	the	rights	
of	women	in	Islam	in	modern	times.
The	fourteenth	essay,	“The	Contingent	Universality	of	Human	Rights:	The	
Case of Freedom of Expression in African and Islamic Contexts” was first 
published	in	997.	An-Na’im	starts	by	citing	example	of	incidents	on	freedom	
of	 expression	 in	 relation	 to	 Islamic	 law	 and	Muslim	 states	 to	 establish	 the	
effect	of	the	interplay	of	the	domestic	and	the	international	on	the	realisation	of	
universal	human	rights	generally.	He	states	that	the	main	premise	of	the	essay	
“is	that	freedom	of	expression	(and	other	human	rights)	possess	a	contingent	
universality”	(p.	0)	which	he	then	goes	on	to	elaborate.	He	“explores	the	nature	
and	dynamics	of	 internal	and	external	variables	 in	 relation	 to	 the	normative	
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and	 empirical	 standing	 of	 freedom	 of	 expression	 at	 both	 the	 domestic	 and	
international	levels”,	the	understanding	of	which	he	argues	is	“necessary	for	
the	 development	 of	 appropriate	 strategies	 for	 promoting	 the	 universality	 of	
freedom	of	expression”	(p.	).	He	 then	proposes	 that	“African	and	Islamic	
societies…	should	seek	to	promote	universality	of	human	rights	as	a	necessary	
response	to	the	realities	of	hegemonic	neo-colonial	designs	of	the	developed	
world”	and	that	“the	needs	of	Islamic	and	African	societies	to	attain	and	sustain	
national	 unity,	 political	 stability,	 and	 economic	 development,	 even	 as	 they	
safeguard	their	cultural	and	religious	integrity,	are	all	better	served	by	a	greater	
protection	 and	 promotion	 of	 freedom	 of	 expression	 than	 by	 its	 violation”	
(p.	).	He	also	addresses	the	issue	of	universality	of	freedom	of	expression	
before	 discussing	 freedom	 of	 expression	 in	 African	 and	 Islamic	 contexts.	
With	 regard	 to	 the	 African	 and	 Islamic	 contexts,	 he	 observes	 that	 “[t]he	
post-independence	 experiences	 of	 almost	 all	African	 and	 Islamic	 countries	
…	 clearly	 show	 that	 decades	 of	 bad	 planning	 and	 poor	 implementation	 of	
economic	 policies,	 corruption	 and	 incompetence	 were	 sustained	 in	 part	
through	systematic	denial	of	freedom	of	expression”	(p.	46).	He,	among	others,	
discusses	 the	 Egyptian	 case	 of	 Nasr	 Hamd	Abu	 Zaid,	 which,	 he	 observes,	
“brought	additional	concerns	about	 Islamic	Shari’a	 law	as	personal	 law	 for	
Muslims	in	Egypt”	(p.	).	The	essay	further	examines	freedom	of	expression	
in	Kenya	and	Sudan,	using	the	latter	to	illustrate	how	a	Muslim	state	could,	
through	its	implementation	of	Islamic	law,	acutely	limit	the	right	to	freedom	of	
expression	in	ways	that	had	contributed	to	the	continuation	of	the	civil	war	in	
the Sudan. In conclusion, An-Na’im proposes specific strategies for integrating 
the	protection	of	freedom	of	expression	in	the	political	and	legal	systems	of	
African	and	Islamic	countries	based	on	 the	earlier	analysis	of	 its	contingent	
universality.
The fifteenth essay,  “Why should Muslims abandon jihad?:	Human	Rights	
and the Future of International Law” was first published in 2006. An-Nai’m’s 
intention	 here	 is	 to,	 realistically	 and	 rhetorically,	 question	 “the	 basis	 of	
prohibitions	of	jihad	and	upholding	the	universality	of	human	rights	in	ways	
that can reaffirm the commitment of Muslims to international legality”. The 
essay starts by first addressing the different meanings of jihad and	indicates	
that	it	is	used	here	“to	refer	to	the	unilateral	use	of	force	by	Muslims	in	pursuit	
of	political	objectives	and	outside	the	institutional	framework	of	international	
legality	and	the	rule	of	law	in	general”.	He	argues	that	“[s]ince	the	framework	
of	legality	and	rule	of	law	is	lacking	in	‘the	real	world’,	there	would	be	no	basis	
for	expecting	Muslims	to	abandon	jihad, as defined” in the essay. He notes that 
“human	beings	everywhere	are	responsible	for	protecting	each	other	against	
the	risks	of	our	shared	vulnerability	to	arbitrary	violence,	poverty	and	injustice	
generally”	and	argues	that	the	important	question,	in	his	view,	is	“how	can	we	
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all fulfil this mutual responsibility, instead of seeing the issues in terms of an 
‘Islamic	threat’	to	human	rights	or	to	the	security	of	some	Western	countries?”	
(p.	78).	However	this	objective	of	protecting	our	shared	vulnerability,	he	notes,	
“would	neither	be	coherent	nor	politically	viable	in	the	absence	of	consistent	
observance	of	these	norms	and	mechanisms	of	the	rule	of	law	in	international	
relations”.	To	achieve	such	observance	and	mechanisms	of	the	rule	of	law	in	
international	relations,	he	states	that	Muslims	should	be	called	upon	to	abandon	
jihad	in	the	sense	of	unilateral	use	of	force	in	pursuit	of	political	objectives,	
in	conformity	with	the	provisions	of	international	law.	However	he	notes	the	
need	to	“realise	that	such	calls	will	not	be	heeded	in	practice	if	those	principles	
are	not	also	honoured	by	other	societies	[and	that]	these	principles	cannot	be	
true	to	their	underlying	rationale	if	they	are	not	inclusive	of	all	of	humanity,	
including	Muslims”	(p.	786).	
The	 essay	 also	 addresses	 the	 issue	 of	 how	 international	 and	 lawful	 is	
international law, wherein he tries to “affirm and promote  the legitimacy and 
efficacy of international law as the indispensable means for realising  universal 
ideals	of	peace,	development	and	the	protection	of	human	rights	everywhere”.	
He	notes	that	“For	international	law	to	play	its	role	in	realising	shared	ideals	
of	justice	and	equality	under	the	rule	of	law	for	all	human	beings	it	must	be	
both	truly	international	and	legitimately	lawful.	It	has	to	be	equally	accepted	
and	 implemented	 by	 all	 human	 societies,	 not	 something	 that	 some	 may	
choose	to	ignore	while	others	are	required	to	observe	it”.	He	asserts	that	under	
international	law	“the	use	of	military	force	is	not	allowed	except		in	accordance	
with	 the	Charter	of	 the	United	Nations,	namely,	 in	 strict	 self-defence	under	
Article		of	the	Charter,	or	when	sanctioned	by	the	Security	Council	under	
Chapter	VII.	There	cannot	by	any	possibility	of	 lawful	use	of	 force	beyond	
these	two	grounds,	whether	claimed	as	‘pre-emptive	self-defence’,	‘just	war’	
or	 Islamic	 jihad”	(p.	787).	He	 then	states	 that	“It	 is	 incoherent	and	futile	 to	
prohibit	aggressive	Islamic	jihad	without	doing	the	same	for	any	use	of	force	
outside	the	ambit	of	the	UN	Charter	in	the	name	of	national	self-interest.	From	
this	 perspective,	 there	 is	 no	moral,	 political	 or	 practical	 difference	between	
international	terrorism	in	the	name	of	Islamic	jihad,	on	the	one	hand,	and	so-
called	pre-emptive	self-defence	or	humanitarian	intervention	claimed	by	the	
USA	in	Iraq,	on	the	other.	Both	are	instances	of	‘self-regulated’	use	of	force	
outside	the	institutional	framework	of	the	UN,	and	are	so	inherently	arbitrary	
and	unaccountable	 that	 they	 undermine	 the	 very	 possibility	 of	 international	
law”.	He	further	emphasises	the	fact	that	“it	is	futile	for	state	actors	to	demand	
observance	of	international	law	principles	by	non-state	actors	when	they	are	
unwilling	 to	abide	by	 those	principles	 themselves”	 (p.	788).	The	essay	 then	
discusses	the	terrorist	act	of	9/	and	the	American	response	to	it	in	relation	to	
the	universality	of	human	rights.	He	states	that	“[t]he	Islamic	tradition	at	large	
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is basically consistent with most human rights norms, except for some specific, 
albeit	very	serious,	aspects	of	the	rights	of	women	and	freedom	of	religion	and	
belief”	(p.	79).	
Finally,	the	essay	addresses	the	issue	of	the	mutual	responsibilities	for	shared	
vulnerabilities,	which,	An-Na’im	argues	depends	largely	on	“how	to	develop	
the	necessary	institutions	and	global	culture	of	the	rule	of	law	in	international	
relations	and	the	protection	of	human	rights	throughout	the	world”.	He	states	that	
“[o]n	the	Islamic	side	of	the	issue,	the	persistent	failure	of	Muslims	to	respond	
effectively	enough	to	the	responsibilities	of	sovereignty	at	home	and	peaceful	
international	relations	abroad	is	as	damaging	for	the	prospects	of	international	
legality	and	universality	of	human	rights	as	the	unilateral	invasion	of	Iraq	by	
the	USA”	(p.	79).	He	concludes	that	“[c]onfronting	terrorism	would	therefore	
include	combating	this	underlying	culture	of	political	violence,	as	well	as	the	
immediate	causes	and	consequences	of	the	use	of	arbitrary	and	indiscriminate	
violence	 in	 the	 furtherance	 of	 political	 ends,	 whoever	 the	 perpetrators	 and	
however we may feel about their alleged justification” (p. 796).
IV. Conclusion: A Theory of Interdependence
The	 sixteenth	 and	 last	 essay	 in	 this	 volume	harnesses	 all	 three	 elements	 of	
Abdullah	An-Na’im’s	 general	 philosophy	 on	 Islam	 and	 human	 rights.	 The	
essay,	 “The	 Interdependence	 of	 Religion,	 Secularism,	 and	 Human	 Rights”,	
was first published in 2005. In it, An-Na’im argues that the apparent tensions 
between	or	among	religion,	secularism	and	human	rights	“can	be	overcome	
by	their	conceptual	synergy”	(p.	6).	He	notes	that	he	is	“not	suggesting	the	
collapse	of	all	related	ideas,	institutions,	and	policies	into	[this]	framework”	
but	that	his	purpose	“is	to	highlight	the	dynamics	of	one	complex	process	that	
might	contribute	to	individual	freedom	and	social	justice”	for	all	(p.	6).	While	
he	believes	that	his	proposition	of	synergy	was	applicable	to	various	religious	
and	political	contexts,	his	“primary	concern	as	a	Muslim	is	the	prospect	for	this	
approach	in	Islamic	societies”	and	“would	like	to	encourage	the	determined	
promotion	–	the	strengthening	–	of	this	synergy	in	the	interest	of	legitimizing	
human rights, regulating the role of religion in public life, and affirming the 
positive	place	of	secularism	in	Islamic	societies”	(p.	7).	He	then	analyses	the	
moral	and	philosophical	foundation	of	human	rights	as	well	as	its	universality,	
the exclusivity of religion and specificity of secularism. As earlier noted in 
Chapter 4, this is a slight departure from, or modification of, his earlier position 
adduced	in	Chapter	,	where	he	had	initially	asserted,	inter alia,	that:	“Muslim	
belief	precludes	a	purely	secular	approach	 to	 law	and	 the	state”	and	argued	
therefore that “the benefits of western secularism in the Muslim world are 
temporary”	 (p.	).	The	current	position	should	however	be	understood	 in	
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the context of his deconstruction and redefinition of the concept of secularism 
in	Chapter	4	as	well	as	in	the	present	essay,	where	he	states,	 inter alia,	 that	
“[w]idespread	confusion	and	suspicion	are	attendant	on	the	term	secularism	
especially	in	Islamic	societies,	which	regard	it	as	a	European,	Christian	concept	
imposed by colonial and neo-colonial forces” and then tries to redefine it in a 
way	that	“is	deeply	contextual	and	dynamic”	to	be	consistent	with	an	Islamic	
and	human	rights	perspective	(p.	6).
In	this	essay,	he	re-emphasises	the	important	role	of	human	agency	in	every	
society	as	well	as	in	his	proposed	synergic	process	by	arguing	that	each	of	the	
three	 paradigms,	 i.e.	 religion,	 secularism,	 and	 human	 rights,	 is	 an	 enabling	
factor of human agency and equally susceptible to be influenced by it”. The 
question	 therefore	 is	 “how	 to	 secure	 the	 best	 conditions	 for	 human	 agency	
to	achieve	the	transformations	required”	(p.	64).	While	he	notes	the	fact	that	
“[h]uman	agency	is	always	integral	to	the	interpretation	and	implementation	
of	 every	 doctrine”	 he	 also	 acknowledges	 that	 “the	 guardians	 of	 orthodoxy	
everywhere	claim	eternal	validity	for	their	own	interpretation	and	practice”	(p.	
6)	so	he	argues	that	it	is	the	principles	of	human	rights	that	can	guarantee	the	
conditions	that	will	facilitate	the	atmosphere	to	challenge	such	orthodox	claims	
from	within.	He	then	analyses	how	human	rights	depend	on	both	secularism	
and	religion	on	 the	one	hand,	and	how	religion	depends	on	both	secularism	
and human rights on the other, and finally how secularism also depends on 
both	religion	and	human	rights.	He	proceeds	to	analyse	this	interdependence	
in	Islamic	contexts	with	examples	again	from	the	issue	of	women’s	rights	in	
Egypt,	and	 the	negotiation	of	 identity	and	politics	 in	 the	Sudan	and	 in	Iran.	
He	ends	this	essay	with	a	strong	assertion	that	“peoples	and	individuals	need	
make	no	choice	among	religion,	secularism,	and	human	rights”.	In	his	view,	
“[t]he	three	can	work	in	synergy”	(p.	80).	He	therefore	urges	“both	scholars	
and	policymakers	to	take	responsibility	for	that	mediation	rather	than	permit	
further	 damage	 to	 be	 done	 by	 belief	 in	 the	 incompatibility	 of	 religion	with	
secular	government	and	human	rights”,	a	human	choice,	he	argues,	that	will	be	
made	by	individuals.
From	these	selected	essays,	I	have	endeavoured	to	identify	Abdullahi	Ahmed	
An-Na’im’s	general	philosophy	on	Islam	and	human	rights	as	a	three-angled	
philosophy,	namely:	(i)	the	philosophy	for	cross-cultural	universality	of	human	
rights,	(ii)	the	philosophy	for	internal	reformation	of	Islamic	law	based	on	the	
methodology	of	his	mentor	Ustadh	Mahmoud	Mohamed	Taha,	 and	 (iii)	 the	
philosophy for re-affirming secularism for Muslim states. Based on this three-
angled	philosophy,	An-Na’im	advocates	a	theory	of	interdependence	between	
Islam,	human	rights	and	secularism	through	which	he	believes	that	Muslims	
should	be	able	to	practice	their	religion	faithfully	and	at	the	same	time	enjoy	
the	guarantees	of	human	rights	without	hindrance.
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Whether	one	agrees,	or	not,	with	every	aspect	of	An-Na’im’s	three-angled	
philosophy	on	Islam	and	human	rights	and	his	theory	of	interdependence,	there	
is no doubt that he is a great scholar whose views make significant contributions 
to	human	rights	discourse	generally	and	to	the	topic	of	Islam	and	human	rights	
particularly.	The	factual	point	is	that	the	questions	he	raises	and	engages	with	
regarding	 the	 relationship	 between	 Islam	 and	 human	 rights	 in	 the	 modern	
world	generally	and	in	modern	Muslim	states	particularly,	are	very	valid	and	
complex	questions,	which	he	himself	acknowledges	could	be	addressed	from	
many	different	perspectives.	He	states,	 for	example,	 in	Chaper	4	 that	“I	am	
not	suggesting	the	collapse	of	all	related	ideas,	institutions,	and	policies	into	
the	framework	I	am	describing.	My	purpose	here	is	to	highlight	the	dynamics	
of	 one	 complex	 process	 that	 might	 contribute	 to	 individual	 freedom	 and	
social	justice”.	As	the	discourse	continues	and	as	Muslims	and	human	rights	
advocates	continue	to	seek	answers	to	these	complex	but	valid	questions,	there	
is	no	doubt	that	Abdullahi	Ahmed	An-Na’im’s	thoughts	as	expressed	in	these	
essays	will	continue	to	be	relevant	to	the	debates	on	the	subject	for	a	very	long	
time,	which	indicates	the	importance	of	this	volume.	Happy	reading!
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